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THE TAX BENEFIT OF BLISSt
ALAN

L.

FELD*

In recent years the Supreme Court has limited its substantive decisions in
federal income tax matters.I For the most part, the handful of tax cases it has
considered each year deal with collection, liens, or other issues peripheral to
doctrinal development in the tax area.2 The Court's recent decision in
Diedrich v. Commissioner,3 however, dealt with a realization question involving net gifts; and its grant of certiorari consolidating the cases of Bliss
4
Dairy, Inc. v. United States and Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner
promises a continuing interest in substantive tax law. Bliss Dairy will enable
the Court to resolve a conflict in the circuits over the application of two tax
doctrines-the tax benefit rule and the General Utilities doctrine-to corporate liquidations. Hillsboro National Bank also involves the application of
the tax benefit rule, but in a different corporate setting.
The tax benefit rule requires a taxpayer to include in income the amount of
a deduction taken in a prior year for costs and expenditures that are not
ultimately incurred. In a tax system based on an annual reporting period,
taxpayers claim deductions for a particular year based on actual cash expenditures or items accrued. But subsequent events sometimes deprive a transaction of its deductible character. For example, suppose in year one a
taxpayer donates property to a charity and claims a deduction for its fair
t © 1982 by Alan L. Feld.
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. A.B., Columbia College,
1960; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1963.
After this article went to press, Congress passed and the President signed the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248 (Aug. 19, 1982)
[hereinafter referred to as the "1982 Act"]. The Act makes significant changes
affecting some corporate acquisitions and distributions, but the changes do not alter
significantly the analysis in this article. Footnotes refer to the relevant changes.
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I Wolfman, Foreword to Note, Supreme Court Decisions in Taxation: 1980 Term,
TAX LAW. 443, 444 (1982).

As to these "other issues," see e.g., Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450
U.S. 156 (1981) (determination of gross income for purposes of depletion deduction
under I.R.C. § 611); HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1 (1981) (per curiam)
(nonprofit corporation providing laundry service to hospitals not a cooperative hospital service organization under I.R.C. § 501(e)(1)(A)).
3 102 S. Ct. 2414 (1982).
4 Bliss Dairy, Inc. v. United States, 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102
S. Ct. 1250 (1982); Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 61 (1979),
aff'd, 641 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1250 (1982). Also see the
later grant of certiorari in Tufts v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 102 S. Ct. 2034 (1982).
2
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market value. Then in year five the charity unexpectedly returns the property. Under the tax benefit rule the taxpayer must include in income for year
five the amount of the recovery. 5 Although Congress never expressly
enacted this rule, section 111 of the Internal Revenue Code 6 establishes the
principle indirectly. This section allows the taxpayer to exclude from income
any portion of a recovery if it did not give rise to an earlier tax benefit. Thus,
in the example above, if the taxpayer had no taxable income from which to
deduct the amount of the donation in year one, section l1l would exclude
from income the return of the property in year five. The tax benefit rule thus
operates to "correct" the initial deduction, but only if the taxpayer earlier
enjoyed a reduction in tax liability.
The other principle under consideration in Bliss Dairy, the General
Utilities doctrine, also arose initially in the courts. It provides that a corporation recognizes no gain when it distributes appreciated property to its shareholders, whether as a dividend or other distribution from an ongoing corporation or as a distribution in partial or comp!ete liquidation. 7 Section 311(a)
now applies this rule to distributions,8 and section 336(a) provides for

s These facts are adapted from Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381
F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967).

I.R.C. § 111 (1976).
The doctrine takes its name from General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering,
296 U.S. 200 (1935). The Court, however, did not actually decide this point because
the government had not raised the issue properly in the course of the litigation.
The General Utilities doctrine has survived significant scholarly criticism. See
6

7

generally Lewis, A Proposed New Treatment for CorporateDistributionsand Sales in
Liquidation, in 3 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1643, 1644-45 (House Ways and

Means Committee, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. 1959) (General Utilities "has weighted the
tax system in favor of business liquidations and traders and against, continuing
businesses."); Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory
Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977); see also B. WOLFMAN, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 10, 22-23 (2d ed. 1982). For a discus-

sion of the undesirable incentive effects of the General Utilities doctrine in corporate
acquisitions, see A. FELD, TAX POLICY AND CORPORATE CONCENTRATION 82-83,
95-96 (1982); cf. Brown, Major Tax Savings Go With U.S. Steel-Marathon Merger,
XIV TAX NOTES 562 (1982) (discussing concerns that corporate funds that might
finance new capital investment are being channeled into tax-motivated investments).
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 created an exception to the General Utilities rule,
requiring recognition of gain for distributions of appreciated property in redemptions
of stock, I.R.C. § 311 (d)(1); the exception, in turn, was hedged about with several

exceptions and limitations, I.R.C. § 311(d)(2). The 1982 Act made more extensive
inroads: Section 222 of the Act recharacterized partial liquidation transactions (other
than distributions in a plan for redemption of all of a corporation's stock) as redemptions, thus bringing them within. § 311, and Section 223 narrowed the § 311(d)(2)
exceptions. The Act also adopted new rules for treating stock purchases as asset
acquisitions. See infra note 44.
S I.R.C. § 311(a) (1976).
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nonrecognition in complete or partial liquidations. 9 In both instances, the
10
Code and the case law create a number of exceptions.
The problem Bliss Dairy presents-and that this Article attempts to
resolve-is the extent to which the tax benefit rule modifies the Code's
General Utilities nonrecognition provisions in a liquidation, so as to require
an inclusion in the corporation's income of an amount previously deducted.
On the other hand, Hillsboro National Bank presents a more orthodox
application of the tax benefit rule, and the case is susceptible of an easier
solution.
I.
A.

THE CASES

Bliss Dairy

The taxpayer in Bliss Dairy, 1 a cash basis corporation that operated a
dairy, purchased some $150,000 of cattle feed for use in its tax year ending
June 30, 1973. The corporation properly deducted the full cost even though a
substantial part of the feed, worth about $60,000, remained on hand at the
end of the tax year. Shortly after the next fiscal year commenced, the
corporation adopted a plan of liquidation pursuant to section 33312 and
9 I.R.C. § 336(a) (1976). The 1982 Act removes partial liquidations from § 336 and
places them under § 311. See supra note 7.
10 Some, but not all, of the exceptions overlap. Both § 311 and § 336 expressly
exclude dispositions of installment obligations. Since its enactment in 1954, § 311 has
excluded distributions of LIFO inventory and of property subject to a liability, or
distributed with another liability, in excess of basis. Section 336 only recently
acquired a LIFO inventory recapture rule, Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act, Pub. L.
No. 96-223, § 403, 94 Stat. 229, 304-05 (1980), and it does not contain a liability in
excess of basis rule. In 1969, Congress added subsection (d) to § 311, recognizing
gain to the corporation on certain redemptions of stock involving appreciated property. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 905, 83 Stat. 487, 713, as
amended by Pub. L. No. 91-675, 84 Stat. 2059 (1970). Section 336 contains no
analogous provision. The 1982 Act expands the instances for recognition of gain
under § 311(d). See supra note 7.
The courts have sanctioned other limitations on these nonrecognition provisions of
the Code. For example, early cases construing § 336 recognized as gain to the
corporation a transfer by a cash basis corporation of income earned but not yet
received. See, e.g., Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d 524, 528-30 (Ct. Cl. 1961);
accord Siegel v. United States, 464 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
918 (1973).
11 645 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1250 (1982).
12 In general, § 333 limits the recognition of gain by qualified electing shareholders of a corporation in a one-month liquidation. An individual recognizes and
treats as a dividend his gain up to his ratable share of the corporation's earnings
and profits, recognizes and treats as capital gain any balance of the gain up to the
amount of money, stock or securities received on the liquidation, and does not
recognize the balance. In return for the nonrecognition this formula permits, the basis
of the property received is not determined by the fair market value of the property
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distributed its assets, including the feed, to its three individual shareholders,
who continued to run the business. The corporation reported no gain attributable to the liquidating distribution of the feed. For their part, the
shareholders determined their basis in the assets distributed, including the
feed, by apportioning their basis in the Bliss Dairy stock. They claimed
deductions for the feed in that amount on their 1973 individual income tax
returns.
The Internal Revenue Service reacted to this apparent double deduction
for the feed by asserting that the tax benefit rule required the corporation to
include the $60,000 in income on liquidation. The corporation paid the
resulting deficiency and sued in federal district court for a refund. Bliss
Dairy argued that the nonrecognition rule of section 336 barred recognition
of any gain by reason of the distribution. The district court granted summary
judgment for the taxpayer based on the Ninth Circuit's prior holding in
Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc. '3 In a brief opinion, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed on the same authority, notwithstanding apparently inconsistent decisions in other circuits. 14 The Service applied for certiorari to resolve
the conflict.
B.

Hillsboro National Bank

In one of the assertedly inconsistent cases that the Ninth Circuit cited,
Hillsboro National Bank, the taxpayer who lost below sought certiorari in
the Supreme Court. The government did not oppose Hillsboro's petition in
order to facilitate review of the tax benefit question in another context. 15
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the case with Bliss
Dairy.
Hillsboro National Bank involved an Illinois personal property tax on
received on the liquidation but by reference to the shareholder's basis in the stock of
the corporation. I.R.C. § 334(c) (1976).
The fact that the corporation remained in existence beyond one month apparently did not defeat the § 333 liquidation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.333-1(b)(1) (1955).
13 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
14 645 F.2d at 19. The court identified three cases in conflict with its holding:
Tennessee-Carolina Transp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979); First Trust and Sav. Bank v. United States, 614

F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1980): and Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 641 F.2d 529
(7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1250 (1982). For a discussion of TennesseeCarolina, see infra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
In addition, two recent lower court cases involve the same issue: Ballou Constr.
Co. v. United States, 526 F. Supp. 403 (D. Kan. 1981); Bonaire Dev. Co. v.
Commissioner, 76 T.C. 789 (1981), aff'd on other grounds, 1982-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH)
9428 (9th Cir. 1982).
'1 Respondent's
Memorandum on Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 10-11,
Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 61 (1979), aff'd, 641 F.2d 529 (7th
Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1250 (1982).
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shares of the stock of Illinois banks.1 6 Although the statute imposed the tax
on the shareholders, it also directed the bank to retain from dividends an
appropriate amount unless assured that shareholders' payments had been
made.1 7 Banks typically paid the tax from their general funds, without
retaining dividends or seeking reimbursement from their shareholders. An
amendment to the Illinois constitution, effective January 1, 1971, abolished
the personal property tax as to individuals. Litigation ensued, challenging
the amendment as a violation of the federal constitution's equal protection
guarantee.1 8 The Illinois legislature directed that, until the matter was
settled, the taxes would be placed in escrow, to be refunded if the amendment was upheld.
Hillsboro paid the 1972 tax under this arrangement and, on its federal
income tax return, deducted the amount paid pursuant to section 164(e).
This section allows a corporation to deduct taxes it pays that are imposed on
its shareholders by virtue of their interest as shareholders.' 9 The shareholder neither includes this payment in income nor deducts the amount as a
personal property tax paid. In 1973, after the United States Supreme Court
upheld the repeal of the tax for individuals, the state paid the escrowed
amounts directly to Hillsboro's individual shareholders, not to the bank.
Hillsboro did not include these refunds in its 1973 income. The Service,
however, contended that the tax benefit rule required the bank to increase its
income to the extent of the 1972 deduction: the bank had enjoyed a recovery
of its 1972 payment when the state issued the refunds to Hillsboro's shareholders. The bank denied that any recovery took place, since it neither
received nor became entitled to the tax refunds. The Tax Court agreed with
the Service that the tax benefit rule controlled and held that the bank had
enjoyed a constructive recovery from the state; 20 on appeal the Seventh
Circuit affirmed. 2 1 It had previously required another Illinois bank to include a similar refund in income under the tax benefit rule. 22 The only
distinction between the cases was that the first bank was joint payee of the
refund check. The court found this distinction immaterial, since the bank
would have been required in any event to pay the refunds to the shareholder.
Judge Pell filed a vigorous dissent. 23
16 The facts of the case are set out at length in the Tax Court's opinion, 73 T.C. at
61-65, as well as in the opinion of the Ninth Circuit, 641 F.2d at 530-31.
17 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 558 (1970).
18 Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973) (upholding
repeal of the tax as to individuals).
19 I.R.C. § 164(e) (1976).
20
21

73 T.C. at 67-68.
641 F.2d at 529.

22 First Trust and Sav. Bank v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1980). The
Bliss Dairy court cited this case as one of the authorities inconsistent with its holding.
See supra note 14.
23 Judge Pell noted three crucial factors indicating that the tax benefit rule should
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One source of possible confusion in Hillsboro National Bank is that the
operation of section 164(e) appears to be inconsistent with usual income tax
principles. Absent section 164(e) and the accompanying regulations, if the
state tax is treated as imposed on the bank's shareholders, the bank's
payment simply would relieve the shareholders of a liability. 24 The bank's
payment would have two separate income tax effects: a payment of state tax
by the shareholders, preceded by a dividend distribution to the shareholders. 25 In most cases, the state tax deduction would simply offset the dividend
income, and the shareholder would undergo no net tax change. The regulations under section 164(e) do in fact provide for this result as to all shareholders; 26 but the deduction for the corporation seems anomalous, since
dividends and other distributions ordinarily do not give rise to corporate
deductions.
Section 164(e) makes better sense if we ignore the purported imposition of
the state tax on shareholders and focus instead on the bank practice of
paying the tax in order to discharge its withholding liability. The legislative
history of the statute, quoted extensively by the dissent in Hillsboro National Bank, suggests that Congress considered taxes like this one as imposed on the bank itself. 27 Seen this way, section 164(e) is a rational

extension of deductibility to the real payer of the tax, and the absence of tax
not apply. First, the bank in reality did not pay the tax voluntarily. Second, when the
refunds were sent to the shareholders, the bank experienced no recovery. Finally,
because all parties conceded that the shareholders would pay tax on the refund, 641
F.2d at 533 & n.4, this sum would be taxed twice. But see infra note 27.

24 See 2 B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS
32.1.2, at 32-37 (1981): cf. Wisconsin Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 526
(1944) (payment of tax with reimbursement by shareholder not deductible under
predecessor to § 164(e)).
25 The discussion assumes sufficient earnings and profits. I.R.C. §§ 316(a),
301c)(1) (1976).
26 Treas. Reg. § 1.164-7 (1957). The rationale for this regulation might be similar to
the one employed in finding no income as a result of interest-free shareholder loans.
E.g., Dean v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 1083, 1087-90 (1961). In the typical case, it
might be contended, the dividend income and the state tax deduction wash against
each other, and this result should be generalized to all shareholders notwithstanding
the occasional nonitemizing shareholder or other taxpayers for whom the wash
would not apply. At least some recent cases, however, appear to follow Dean to
avoid a disturbing 20-year-old precedent, but not out of respect for its rationale.
Commissioner v.-Greenspun, 670 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1982), ajf'g 72 T.C. 931 (1979);
Beaton v. Commissioner, 664 F.2d 315 (lst Cir. 1981); Martin v. Commissioner, 649
F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981).
27 The dissent, however, failed to take adequate account of the change in the
relative financial positions of the bank and its shareholders by reason of the bank's
payment of the 1972 taxes and the shareholders' receipt of the subsequent refund.
The net effect was to enrich the shareholders and reduce the bank's net worth in the
same way as a dividend.
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effect to the shareholders is congruent with the treatment of any tax imposed
on the corporation and paid by it.
II.

THE TAX BENEFIT RULE

Both Bliss Dairy and Hillsboro National Bank turn on the application of
the tax benefit rule-a rule to which differing purposes and meanings have
been ascribed. One early statement which the Service favors suggests
breadth and flexibility in application: "When recovery or some other event
which is inconsistent with what has been done in the past occurs, adjustment
must be made in reporting income for the year in which the change occurs."128 Most of the litigated cases involve actual recoveries, however, and
29
much discussion of the rule has spoken of a "recovery" in the later year.
In Bliss Dairy the corporation received nothing upon the liquidation, while in
Hillsboro National Bank an actual recovery went to the bank's shareholders, not to the bank. Part of the question in these cases is whether the tax
benefit rule requires an actual recovery or whether a constructive recovery,
perhaps predicated on an "inconsistent event," will suffice.
Courts have offered several rationales for the tax benefit rule. 30 One court,
in a case involving the collection of loans previously charged off as bad
debts, described the prior deduction as having allowed the bank to recoup
capital lost when the debts were thought to have become worthless.3 1 The
debt itself accordingly represents the income shielded from tax in the year of
the deduction. When paid, the lender must treat it as income to avoid a
doubling of its capital on the transaction. Another court described the
inclusion in income in the later year as a necessary balancing entry to
account for income removed from the tax system by the earlier deduction.3 2
Still another court, incorporating an estoppel theory, held that a deduction
taken in an earlier year was an implied consent to be taxed if there was a
subsequent recovery. 33 Despite their different formulations, these courts
28 Estate of W. Block v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 338, 341 (1939) (emphasis
added in Rev. Rul. 74-396), aff'd sub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111
F.2d 60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940), cited with approval in Rev. Rul.
74-396, 1974-2 C.B. 107. For a discussion of this Revenue Ruling, see infra note 55.
29 See, e.g., Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1970); Estate of David B.
Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 680-81 (1975) (Tannenwald, J.,concurring).
For a discussion of Munter, see infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text. In addition,
the statutory tax benefit rule, § I11, refers to the "recovery" exclusion. I.R.C. § 111
(1976).
30 The cases are collected and discussed in I B. BITTKER, supra note 24,
5.7.1.
31 National Bank of Commerce v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 875, 876-77 (9th Cir.
1940).
32 Barnett v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 864, 867 (1939): South Dakota Concrete
Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 1429, 1432 (1932).
33 Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Rothensies, 43 F. Supp. 923, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1942).
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seem to treat the tax benefit rule as a necessary concomitant of the annual
accounting system,3 4 to prevent a deduction for a nonexistent cost, contribution, or expenditure.
One important feature of the tax benefit rule is the relative simplicity of its
application to specific deductions. Perhaps for this reason, courts have not
applied it to depreciable property, for which a more complex set of adjustments might be required. 35 In 1962 and 1964 Congress enacted specific
recapture provisions for dispositions of depreciable property. 36 On neither
occasion was the change articulated as an extension of the tax benefit rule.37
Moreover, though property currently expensed bears similarities to depreciable property, the two categories can be conceptualized differently. The
former figures directly in the calculation of the income stream of a taxpayer,
while the latter, treated as "property," gives rise to effects on income but
also exists separate from its calculation. 38 Perhaps for this reason as well,
depreciation falls outside the tax benefit rule.
34

See Estate of David B. Munter, 63 T.C. 663, 678 (1975) (Tannenwald, J.,

concurring): Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L. REV. 265,
269-70 (1978).
35 In applying the tax benefit rule to an expensed item, a court needs to determine only the amount of the prior deduction and the value conferred through the
recovery or other event triggering the rule. Depreciation is more complex because it
involves an allocation of the investment in the asset over a period of time and may
involve a variety of adjustments to capital account. When the adjusted basis of
depreciable property is compared to its fair market value at the time of a recovery,
questions can arise as to what amounts of the recovery are attributable to the earlier
deductions and what amounts to fluctuations in the price of the asset. The Supreme
Court has emphatically disapproved an attempt to tie depreciation to sales price, as
an unwarranted commingling of depreciation with market fluctuations. Fribourg
Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272 (1966).
36 Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (codified as I.R.C.
§ 1245); Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 231, 78 Stat. 19 (codified as I.R.C.
§ 1250). Section 1245 applies to personal property and certain other property. Section
1250 applies a more relaxed recapture rule to depreciable realty. These provisions
exempt certain nonrecognition transactions from recapture, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 332 &
351, but recapture overrides the nonrecognition distribution provisions of I.R.C.
§§ 311, 336 & 337. See O'Hare, Statutory Nonrecognition of Income and the Overriding Principle of the Tax Benefit Rule in the Taxation of Corporationsand Shareholders, 27 TAX L. REV. 215, 216-18 (1972).
37 See S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 95-101, reprintedin 1962 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3297, 3398-404; H. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 101-09,
reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1313, 1409-18.
38 Cf. Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958) (distinguishing a
right to receive future income from "property" under the predecessor of § 1221);
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (gift of interest coupons not a transfer of
-property"): A. FELD, CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES-THE SALE OR EXCHANGE
A-15 (BNA Tax Mgmt. Portfolios 1977) (discussing the distinction
between a sale of property and a sale of a right to future income).
REQUIREMENT,
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III.

APPLICATION OF THE TAX BENEFIT RULE TO

Hillsboro National Bank
The idea of the tax benefit rule as a simple corrective for distortions that
otherwise would result from computing taxable income on an annual basis
suggests at least a minimum standard for its application. If no deduction
would have been allowed had all relevant events taken place within the same
taxable period, then the earlier deduction should be corrected when the
same events are separated into two or more tax periods. In this case, the tax
benefit rule should require an inclusion in income in the later period to
negate the earlier deduction.
Under this standard, Hillsboro National Bank presents a relatively clear
case for inclusion. The bank remitted money to the state treasury in 1972
that the state paid to bank shareholders in 1973. If the state had remitted the
refunds to shareholders in 1972, the dividend character of the transactions
would have been clear. The bank could have claimed no deduction because,
in fact, there would have been no event during the year that gave rise to one:
the bank wound up paying no tax for the year and section 164(e) would not
apply. Instead, the normal corporate dividend rules would operate, with
income recognized by the shareholders and no deduction available to the
corporation. Consequently, when the events are spread over two years, the
tax benefit rule should apply in the later one so as to negate the 1972
deduction claimed by the bank and eliminate any distortion resulting from
39
annual accounting.
IV.
A.

APPLICATION OF THE TAX BENEFIT RULE TO

Bliss Dairy

Legislative History and Judicial Constructions of the Nonrecognition
Provisions

The minimum standard that disposes of Hillsboro National Bank, however, does not resolve the question in Bliss Dairy; the relationship between
the statutory nonrecognition provisions derived from General Utilities and
the tax benefit rule cannot be solved by collapsing the temporal sequence.
Section 336 provides for nonrecognition of gain in a liquidation and, absent
the tax benefit rule, it would apply even if the expensing and the distribution
occurred in the same year. Whether the tax benefit rule overrides nonrecognition turns on other considerations implicit in the legislative history of the
nonrecognition provisions as interpreted in case-law development.
1. Section 336: The South Lake Farms Case
The Ninth Circuit and the district court both viewed their Bliss Dairy
40
decisions as controlled by Commissioner v. South Lake Farms, Inc.
39 Section 311 (a) would not bar application of the tax benefit rule here, since the

bank's constructive dividend-in essence a right to receive income-would fall
within the congressionally approved limitation on section 311, discussed infra notes
58-63 and accompanying text.
40 36 T.C. 1027 (1961), aff'd, 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
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There, the shareholders of Old Corporation, an accrual basis taxpayer engaged in farming, sold their stock to an unrelated investor-Purchasing
Corporation-five months after the close of Old Corporation's 1956 tax
year. 4 1 Old Corporation had planted cotton which was due to be harvested
shortly after the sale, and also had prepared land for the planting of barley.
Old Corporation deducted over $700,000 for expenditures connected with
the cotton crop and the land preparation, partly in its 1956 tax year and
partly in the year of sale. The purchase price for the Old Corporation stock
reflected these elements of value.
Shortly after it purchased the stock, Purchasing Corporation liquidated
Old Corporation. Under sections 336 and 332,42 neither Old Corporation nor
Purchasing Corporation recognized gain or loss on the liquidation. Unlike
many other nonrecognition events, in which the basis of the assets to the old
entity carries over to the new, 43 this liquidation did not give Purchasing
Corporation a basis in the assets determined by Old Corporation's basis.
Instead, Purchasing Corporation computed its basis in the assets it obtained
from Old Corporation under section 334(b)(2), 44 by allocating its stock
basis-determined by the amount Purchasing Corporation paid Old Corpora40
41

36 T.C. 1027 (1961), aff'd 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963).
The facts are set out extensively in 36 T.C. at 1028-35, and again in 324 F.2d at

841-44 (dissenting opinion).
42 I.R.C. § 332 (1976) provides in part: "(a) GENERAL RULE-No gain or loss
shall be recognized on the receipt by a corporation of property distributed in complete liquidation of another corporation." Subsection (b) goes on to state in essence
that this nonrecognition applies to liquidation of subsidiaries-80% or more controlled-within one year. In contrast to §§ 336 and 337, which allow nonrecognition
for the distributor, § 332 provides nonrecognition to the distributee.
43 E.g., I.R.C. § 334(b)(1) (1976) (general provision for liquidation of a subsidiary); id. § 362(b) (nonrecognition in corporate reorganization).
44 I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1976). Section 334(b)(2) codified the result in KimbellDiamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff"d per curiain, 187 F.2d
718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951). In that case the taxpayer, whose
plant had been destroyed by fire, bought the stock of another corporation whose
assets it wished to use as a replacement. Shortly thereafter, the taxpayer liquidated
the other corporation and took the assets in distribution. At issue was whether the
taxpayer's basis in the replacement assets was determined by its basis in the stock of
the liquidated corporation or by that corporation's basis in the assets. If,as the
taxpayer argued, the liquidation provisions applied, its basis in the assets was the
same as the basis in the hands of the liquidated corporation under the predecessor to
Code § 334(b)(1). The Service treated the transaction as an elaborate purchase of
assets, so that the purchase price determined the basis in the assets. The Tax Court
agreed with the Service's treatment, and Congress codified this result in 1954.
The 1982 Act, Section 224, repeals § 334(b)(2) and substitutes new § 338 to govern
stock purchases treated as asset purchases. Two important changes are that the tax
treatment is expressly elective and that if the election is made so as to give the
purchasing corporation the basis benefits of a purchase of assets, the target corporation is treated as if it had sold its assets pursuant to § 337.
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tion shareholders-pro rata to the assets it received on liquidation. In this
manner Purchasing Corporation allocated about $1,600,000 of basis to the
budding cotton crop, which it promptly increased by $270,000 it spent to
harvest the crop. Purchasing Corporation's gross receipts for the crop
amounted to $1,850,000, and it reported a small net loss on the crop-the
difference between its basis and its gross receipts. Purchasing Corporation
also allocated about $220,000 of its basis to the barley land preparation. Old
Corporation reported no income for the cotton crop and deducted all the
expenses it incurred with regard to the crop. Thus, as a result of the sale and
4
liquidation, one year's cotton crop escaped corporate income tax entirely,
while Old Corporation used its expense deductions attributable to the crop
to offset other income.
The Service asserted deficiencies against Old Corporation on alternative
theories. First, using the power under section 446(b) to recompute income if
the taxpayer's accounting method does not "clearly reflect income, ' 46 it
sought to increase Old Corporation's income by $1,800,000, the value of the
unharvested crop and barley land preparation at the time of liquidation.
Alternatively, and at the very least, the Service wanted to recapture the
approximately $700,000 of Old Corporation's deductions attributable to the
crop and land. Section 482, which allows the Service to reallocate income,
deductions or credits among taxpayers under common control, also applies
'4 7
when necessary "clearly to reflect the income.'
The Tax Court rejected both theories. Old Corporation's accounting
method clearly reflected income; indeed, it used the accrual method, which
the Service generally prefers. 48 No accounting method, not even the accrual
method, required unharvested crops to be included in income. As for section
49
482, that provision allows deductions to be reallocated, not disallowed. It
is appropriate when the wrong taxpayer claims a deduction, not when two
taxpayers claim the same one.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Service renewed the section 446(b)
contention for inclusion of the cotton crop income. Like the Tax Court, the
4- The cotton crop increment that escaped corporate income tax was roughly the
$1,600,000 increase in basis resulting from the § 334(b)(2) allocation of the stock
basis to the cotton crop. Without a sale and liquidation, had Old Corporation
harvested the crop at the same cost ($270,000) and realized the same amount on its
sale ($1,850,000), the gain would have been the amount realized ($1,850,000) less
basis ($270,000 of harvesting costs), or $1,580,000 (Old Corporation already had
deducted $500,000 in planting costs).
46 1.R.C. § 446(b) (1976).
47 I.R.C. § 482 (1976).
48 See Schapiro, Prepayments and Distortion of Income Under Cash Basis for
Accounting, 30 TAx L. REV. 117, 120-27 (1975).

49 36 T.C. at 1042. The Tax Court did not address an alternative argument for the
taxpayers, that the common control required by § 482 was absent here at the time the
deductions were taken.
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Ninth Circuit could think of no accounting method that would include the
unharvested crop in income.50 As to the smaller deficiency, the Service
abandoned its section 482 argument,' substituting other contentions based
on section 446(b) and the tax benefit rule. Although the deductions for crop
expenditures were proper when taken, the value these expenditures contributed to the crop figured into the price that Purchasing Corporation paid for
the Old Corporation stock. Thus, the Service argued, Old Corporation in
effect recovered the amounts that gave rise to its deductions and the recovery should be included in its income. The Ninth Circuit rejected this contention. Although section 334(b)(2) treated Purchasing Corporation as if it had
purchased assets rather than stock, under section 336 Old Corporation was
not the seller of the assets. Old Corporation, in fact, received nothing; any
tax by reason of the sale fell on the actual sellers, the shareholders. The
court distinguished cases on which the Service relied 5 2 on the ground that
they involved write-offs, which it said are based on expectations, not outof-pocket expenses. When a deduction is based on actual expenses, the
court concluded, actual receipt of property is necessary to trigger inclusion
in income under the tax benefit rule. 3
The facts of South Lake Farms squarely raised the question of how to apply
the tax benefit rule in a liquidation in which basis does not carry over to the
distributee. Yet the tax benefit issue was not addressed at all in the Tax
Court, nor was it the central contention before the Ninth Circuit. Both
courts found for the taxpayer, notwithstanding that the result in effect
allowed double use of the cotton farming expense deduction. Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit admitted that its decision was "something of a tax windfall to
the stockholders of the old corporation. ' 54 It felt compelled nonetheless to
apply the nonrecognition provisions strictly without allowing the tax benefit
rule to mitigate their effect. 5
324 F.2d at 839.
"' The Service probably was correct in conceding this issue. Nevertheless, there
is some irony in the fact that 17 months earlier, before a panel that included two of the
three South Lake Farms judges, the government prevailed under § 482 in a case
involving a similar fact pattern, but arising under § 351. Rooney v. United States, 305
F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962) (upholding allocation of deductions between the preincorporation expenditures and the post-incorporation harvest).
52 Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 290 F.2d 932 (Ct. Cl. 1961);
West Seattle Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961); Commissioner
v. First State Bank of Stratford, 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1948).
-3324 F.2d at 840.
SO

54

Id.

51 For eleven years, the Service expressed no view on the decision. Finally, in
Revenue Ruling 74-396, 1974-2 C.B. 106, it applied the tax benefit rule to a § 336
liquidation, primarily to prevent any disparity in result under §§ 337 and 336. Under
this rationale, the South Lake Farms requirement of an actual recovery was too
restrictive.
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2.

The Legislative History of Sections 311 and 336 and First State Bank
of Stratford

One of the tax benefit cases that the South Lake Farms court distinguished
deserved closer attention in light of the relevant legislative history of the
1954 Code. The Senate report to section 311, which generally adopted the
General Utilities principle of nonrecognition of gain for a corporate distribution of appreciated property to shareholders, approved a continuing judicial
limitation on the statutory nonrecognition principle. "[Y]our committee
does not intend to change existing law with respect to attribution of income
of shareholders to their corporation as exemplified for example in First State
Bank of Stratford v. Commissioner ....*"56 Subsequent case law equated
the nonrecognition provisions in section 311 and 336 in this regard, 57 so that
the scope of the Bank of Stratford exception is significant for liquidation
cases as well.
In FirstState Bank of Stratford v. Commissioner,5 8 the taxpayer bank had
deducted as bad debts certain notes that it held. When the bank discovered
that the notes would be paid, the bank declared a dividend of the notes in
kind to its shareholders. 59 The bank contended that the General Utilities
principle prevented recognition of gain to it on the distribution. The Tax
Court agreed, rejecting the Commissioner's argument that distribution of the
60
notes was an assignment of the right to receive income.
The Commissioner took an appeal to the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the
Tax Court. The opinion mingled two lines of argument-one based on the
Consequently, it came as something of a surprise the following year that the
Service announced, without further comment, its acquiescence in South Lake
Farms. 1975-1 C.B. 2. It took another ruling to explain that the acquiescence referred
only to the Tax Court opinion in that case, which rejected the § 446(b) and § 482
theories of inclusion. Rev. Rul. 77-67, 1977-1 C.B. 33; see supra notes 48-49 and
accompanying text. The tax benefit argument-first raised on appeal-was not part of
the acquiescence. The Service nevertheless withdrew the acquiescence and substituted a nonacquiescence. 1977-1 C.B. 2.
Revenue Ruling 74-396 is criticized in Broenen, The Tax Benefit Rule and Sections
332, 334(b)(2) and 336, 53 TAXES 231 (1975).
56 S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 247, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4623, 4884.
57 Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1973); Williamson
v. United States, 292 F.2d 524 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
58 8 T.C. 831 (1947), rev'd, 168 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 867
(1948).
59 The bank actually assigned the notes to one of its officers as agent for the
shareholders; he collected the payments and deposited them in a separate account.

168 F.2d at 1005.

Distinguishing the now classic assignment of income cases of Helvering v.
Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940), and Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), the Tax
Court noted that here the entire tree, as well as the fruit, was assigned to the
shareholders. 8 T.C. at 836.
60
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tax benefit rule and the other on assignment of income cases. 6 1 Although the
court never identified precisely what income had been assigned, the payment
of the debt itself would have given rise to income only through the operation
of the tax benefit rule. The Fifth Circuit saw the question as one of realization, which occurred when the bank distributed the notes to the shareholders. The court apparently adopted the rationale that viewed the tax benefit
rule as converting the previously deducted note from a capital asset into
income. 62 The court distinguished General Utilities as involving a distribution of capital assets; here the bank in effect distributed the income from
63
prior years that had been sheltered from taxation.
As an original matter, the effect of Bank of Stratford's preservation in the
legislative history of section 311 might have been confined to distributions
from ongoing corporations, the situation that section 311 directly addressed.
A court soon held, however, that sections 336 and 311 should be construed
similarly regarding assignment of income, 64 and that Bank of Stratford
limited both sections. In South Lake Farms, the Ninth Circuit grouped Bank
of Stratford with cases involving the deduction of bad debt reserves, apparently on the mistaken view that the bank had suffered no out-of-pocket costs
in connection with the deduction. But the bank had made actual advances of
money to the borrowers and predicated the deduction on the likely nonpayment of the notes, just as the taxpayer in South Lake Farms actually paid
planting expenses and deducted them. Since both corporations later conferred the value attributable to the earlier deducted expense on the shareholders, the two situations cannot be distinguished on this ground.
3. The Section 337 Cases
The interplay between the tax benefit rule and the General Utilities principle also arises in cases involving section 337 liquidations, in which nonrecognition applies to gain or loss on corporate sales of property during a
one-year liquidation. 65 Before 1954, two similar ways of selling an appreciated corporate business to an outside party produced different results.
A sale of the assets by the corporation followed by a distribution of the
proceeds to shareholders resulted in tax at the corporate level as well as
6 168 F.2d at 1006-07. It is not surprising that the court did not carefully distinguish between these two approaches. They reflect sometimes overlapping methods of
dealing with attempts to reduce the income of the transferor. See generally Morrison,

Assignment of Income and Tax Benefit Principles in Corporate Liquidation, 54

902 (1976) (discussing both principles as they relate to liquidation).
National Bank of Commerce v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1940).
63 168 F.2d at 1009.
64 Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d 524, 528-29 (Ct. Cl. 1961), in which, in a
§ 336 liquidation of a cash basis corporation, it distributed accounts receivable to its
sole shareholder. The court used the same reasoning employed in Bank of Stratford
to find the income taxable to the corporation.
TAXES
62

65

I.R.C. § 337 (1976).
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capital gain to the shareholders; 66 however, because of the General Utilities
principle, a distribution of the assets in liquidation to shareholders followed
by a sale to an outsider resulted in no tax to the corporation and capital gain
to the shareholders. It appeared that whether one or another result obtained
often turned on formal differences and created uncertainty for tax planners. 67 Section 337 eliminated the uncertainty by providing for no corporate
68
tax on the direct sale.
Since 1967, a series of cases have consistently applied the tax benefit rule
to section 337 liquidations. 69 The facts of Estate of David B. Munter v.
Commissioner70 are typical. The corporation, which rented linens to hotels,
restaurants, and other commercial users, expensed the items when they were
purchased and placed in service. 71 In 1967 the corporation adopted a plan of
liquidation under section 337 and sold the business to an unrelated purchaser. The sales agreement allocated $175,000 to linens and other items of
personal property on hand that had been expensed. On audit, the Commissioner determined that the corporation was entitled to no deduction for linen
supplies purchased and then sold in 1967 since such a deduction did not
The corporation's sale of assets results in gain or loss under I.R.C. § 1001,
although the character of the gain or loss and the amount is determined under various
other Code provisions. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 1201, 1221, 1222 (capital gain provisions);
I.R.C. § 1231 (property used in a trade or business); I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250 (recapture
upon sale of depreciable property or realty). For shareholders, a distribution in
complete or partial liquidation is treated as an exchange of stock. I.R.C. § 331.
67 Compare Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) with United
States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950). These cases were
singled out in the legislative history as leading to the enactment of§ 337. S. REP. No.
1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49, reprintedin 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4623,
4679-80.
68 Not all sales escape corporate taxation. Nonrecognition in § 337 applies only to
§ 337 "property," which does not include stock in trade-except in limited
circumstances-or certain installment obligations. I.R.C. § 337(b)(1) (1976). As with
§ 336, see supra note 10, there are judicial exclusions to § 337 treatment. See, e.g.,
Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1973) (long-term
contracts, though not expressly excluded from § 337 property, included in income
under assignment of income doctrine).
69 In 1967, the Tax Court held that the tax benefit rule would not require an
inclusion in income when previously expensed items were sold in a § 337 liquidation. Anders v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 815 (1967); see Note, The Tax Benefit,
66

Recoveries, and Sales of Property Under Section 337, 9 WM. & MARY L.

REV.

476

(1967) (supporting the Tax Court result in Anders). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
reversed the decision, Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969), and since that time the decisions have without exception
applied the tax benefit rule to § 337. E.g., Connery v. United States, 460 F.2d 1130
(3d Cir. 1972); Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970). For a
discussion of these and other cases, see Note, The Tax Benefit Rule and Corporate
Liquidations:Baiting the "Trap for the Unwary," 4 J. CORP. L. 681, 691-94 (1979).
70 63 T.C. 663 (1975).
7' The items had an expected useful life of between 12 and 18 months.
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clearly reflect income. As to deductions in prior years, the Commissioner
included in income approximately $102,000 of the gain from the sale of linen
supplies as representing recovery of amounts previously deducted.
The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner. In its view Congress intended
section 337 to exempt asset appreciation from the corporate tax, not to
preempt the tax benefit rule. Admittedly the corporation satisfied the literal
terms of section 337, but the difference between the amount realized from
the sale of expensed items and their basis was not gain in the section 337
sense. The items' zero basis resulted from their "fictional conversion" from
property into consumed items of expense. 72 In effect, the tax benefit rule
returned the property's true basis, 73 the amount the taxpayer originally paid
for it, so that there was no gain in the sale; rather, the amount received was
taxable as ordinary income on the reconversion of the expensed items into
property.
In addition, the Tax Court placed special emphasis on the need to have
sections 336 and 337 yield comparable results. 74 Its own precedent on
section 336, however, consisted of South Lake Farms. The court neatly
skirted this apparent problem by noting that the Service never raised the tax
benefit argument before the Tax Court in that case. 75 Thus, South Lake
Farms had little precedential value on this issue.
Judge Tannenwald concurred in Munter. 76 He described the tax benefit
rule "as a necessary counterweight" to the problems inherent in annual
accounting and stated three conditions for its application, all present in
Munter-an amount previously deducted, a resulting tax benefit, and a
recovery. Judge Tannenwald disagreed with the majority's assimilation of
section 337 nonrecognition, when the corporation receives money or other
property for its assets, to nonrecognition under section 336. He found some
"difficulty in seeing how a distribution in liquidation under section 336 of an
asset that has previously been expensed can constitute a 'recovery' so as to
justify the application of the tax benefit rule." ' 77
4.

The Tennessee-Carolina Case

In 1975, the Tax Court finally held squarely that the tax benefit rule applies
in section 336 liquidations. In Tennessee-Carolina Transportation, Inc. v.
63 T.C. at 675 (citing Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195, 198 (9th Cir.
1970)). This language recalls the earlier rationale of the tax benefit rule as reversing
the conversion of capital into income that resulted from the earlier, and now incorrect, deduction. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
73 Id. at 676 (citing Anders v. United States, 462 F.2d 1147, 1149 (Ct. CI. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)).
74 Id. at 676-77.
72

71 Id.

at 677.

Id. at 678-82 (Tannenwald, J.,concurring).
71 Id. at 680. The taxpayer in Hillsboro National Bank relied in part on Judge
Tannenwald's "actual recovery" formulation in attempting to avoid application of
the tax benefit rule.
76
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Commissioner,7 8 after the taxpayer corporation purchased all the stock of
Service Lines, Inc. ("SLI"), it liquidated SLI in a transaction to which
sections 332, 334(b)(2), and 336 applied. SLI distributed to the taxpayer tires
and tubes that it previously had expensed. The Service used the tax benefit
rule to include the fair market value of these items on hand at the date of
distribution-which the Tax Court later found was about $36,000--in the
income of SLI's final year. Relying on South Lake Farms, the taxpayer
contended that nothing was realized for the tires and tubes and thus there
was no recovery.
The Tax Court, however, found the taxpayer's view of "recovery" unduly restrictive and held for the Commissioner. 79 Since for tax purposes SLI
had consumed the tires and tubes, the Tax Court deemed SLI to have
received the items just prior to the liquidation. Otherwise, SLI would have
had nothing to distribute.
Judge Simpson concurred. 80 For him, the recovery derived from the
application of section 334(b)(2) to determine the basis of the assets distributed to the parent. Just as this basis rule treats the taxpayer as if it purchased
the assets of SLI, a symmetrical view should treat SLI as recovering the sale
price of the assets. Judge Simpson specifically refused to take a position on
the tax consequences of other types of liquidations.
In dissent, Judge Tannenwald placed this case squarely within the reservation he had expressed in his Munter concurrence. 81 There was neither actual
recovery of property nor economic benefit to SLI. 8 2 He found the majority's
concern with a double deduction misplaced as to SLI, which realized nothing on the liquidation and took no extra deduction. The second deduction for
the same tubes and tires accrued to another party, Tennessee-Carolina, and
it arose because section 334(b)(2) allows a stepped-up basis to the distributee. This advantage should not affect the distributor's income. The desire
for parity between sections 336 and 337 should not alter this result, Judge
Tannenwald added, since the specific limitations in section 337 make complete congruence impossible. 83
78 65 T.C. 440 (1975), aff'd, 582 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1978). The case is analyzed in
Byrne, The Tax Benefit Rule as Applied to CorporateLiquidationsand Contributions
to Capital: Recent Developments, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 215 (1980).
79 The Tax Court cited two other cases, Bear Mfg. Co. v. United States, 430 F.2d

152 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971), and Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 82 (1971), aff'dpercuriam, 456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972), that

applied the tax benefit rule without requiring an actual recovery. 65 T.C. at 447.
80 65 T.C. at 449 (Simpson, J., concurring).
s

Id. at 449-55 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting). Six other judges joined in this

dissent.

Judge Tannenwald distinguished the cases cited by the majority as involving no
actual recovery, see supra note 79, on the ground that they did release the taxpayer
from a liability, with a consequent increase in net worth. 65 T.C. at 450. No' such
comparable benefit to SLI occurred here.
83 This observation had been made in Midland-Ross Corp. v. United States, 485
82

F.2d 110, 117-18 & n.12 (6th Cir. 1973), a case that applied the anticipatory assign-

ment of income doctrine to a liquidation under § 337.
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The taxpayer appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which upheld the decision
below. It focused first on the parity issue and, unlike Judge Tannenwald,
found persuasive the argument that sections 336 and 337 should yield similar
results. 8 4 Then, rejecting the restrictive view of a "recovery," the court
adverted instead to the government's broad definition of the tax benefit rule
as applicable whenever there is an inconsistent event following a deduction. 85 In this case, the distribution of the tires and tubes with a stepped-up
basis was inconsistent with the prior expensing of them. Finally the court
concluded that, if a recovery is necessary under the tax benefit rule, there
was a recovery either in the reconversion of property that for tax purposes
or in SLI's receipt of its own stock in
had previously been consumed,
86
exchange for the assets.
B.

Appropriateness of the Tax Benefit Rule in Bliss Dairy

The tax benefit rule, firmly established as a judicial limitation in numerous
areas of taxation, should apply to corporate distributions otherwise entitled
to nonrecognition. Congress approved the limitation respecting section 311
when it preserved the result of Bank of Stratford. Bliss Dairy offers an

opportunity to elaborate the scope of this limitation.
A narrow reading of the limitation, requiring an actual recovery before the
tax benefit rule can be invoked, probably is not warranted. Bank of Stratford
itself did not involve an actual recovery by the taxpayer. The case applied
assignment of income principles to include income to the bank when it
turned away an imminent recovery. As an assignment of income case, Bank
of Stratford is unusual in that it involved neither personal services income
nor a split of income and income-producing property as in the classic cases
it cites such as Helvering v. Horst, Helvering v. Clifford, and Lucas v.

Earl,87 The bank transferred its entire interest in the notes to the shareholders. Nor did the bank "receive" the recovery prior to the transfer in any
conventional accounting sense. Nevertheless, the conjunction of the earlier
deduction and the transfer to shareholders resulted in the realization of
income to the distributing bank in a fashion that Congress implicitly has
approved.
It is instructive to consider a hypothetical case based on Bliss Dairy but
arising under section 311, in which an ongoing corporation distributes an
expensed item to its shareholders. Suppose Bliss Dairy had continued in
582 F.2d at 380.
85 Id. at 382 (citing Estate of W. Block v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 338, 340-41
84

(1939), aff'd sub nom. Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F.2d 60 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 658 (1940)). See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
86 582 F.2d at 382. Judge Weick dissented on the application of the tax benefit rule
in an opinion that followed fairly closely the rationale in Judge Tannenwald's dissent.
Id. at 383-88.
87 Bank of Stratford, 168 F.2d at 1008 (citing Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112

(1940), Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), and Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111
(1930)).
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operation, having earlier purchased feed for $150,000, deducted this amount,
and actually used $90,000 worth. It wished to distribute a $60,000 cash
dividend to its individual shareholders. In lieu of a cash dividend, it distrib.uted the remaining feed. Then it purchased $60,000 of feed in the market,
deducted the $60,000, and used the feed in its business. The hypothetical
involves no actual recovery by the corporation. Yet without an inclusion in
income on the distribution under the tax benefit rule, the corporation will
have deducted $210,000-$150,000 initially and $60,000 later-for the con88
sumption in its business of only $150,000 worth of feed.
It is an extension from Bank of Stratford, but only a short one, to apply the
tax benefit rule in this case and limit the corporation to its proper deduction,
$150,000. Unlike Bank of Stratford, in which the events turned out to belie a

single deduction earlier claimed, the problem here is to prevent two deductions, one past and one future, for a single economic investment. The tax
benefit standard should apply to obviate the opportunity to obtain a future
tax benefit in addition to the past one; the corporation accordingly should
not be allowed to distribute the expensed feed to individual shareholders
89
without first taking the duplicate deduction back into income.
If the tax benefit rule applies to an ongoing corporation under section 311
on these facts, it should apply as well to a liquidating corporation under
section 336. The Court of Claims' decision that extended the Bank of
Stratford limitation from section 311 to section 336 has remained undisturbed for twenty years. 90 The tax benefit rule should apply to liquidation
cases like Tennessee-Carolina and Bliss Dairy to serve the salutary function

of eliminating the potential for deductions in excess of the economic cost to
the corporation and its distributees.
Unlike a dividend to individuals, however, a liquidation may involve the
complication of nonrecognition of gain or loss to the distributee. In a section
332 liquidation in which basis is determined under section 334(b)(1), no
problem of double benefit arises because of continuity of basis. The zero
basis in the hands of the distributor corporation carries over to the distributee. Suppose, for example, that New Corporation has owned all the stock
88 From a tax perspective, individual shareholders will be indifferent as to
whether they receive feed or cash. In either case they will include in income a
dividend of $60,000, assuming adequate earnings and profits. I.R.C. § 301(b)(1)(A)
(1976). Their basis in the feed will likewise be $60,000, its fair market value. Id.
§ 301(d)(1). If they sell the feed to unrelated third parties, they can recoup the
$60,000 in cash without payment of additional tax. If, however, the shareholders sell
the feed to or through their ongoing corporation, the corporation may be deemed to
have effected the sale itself. See United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952); Bush Bros. & Co. v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 424
(1979), aff'd, 668 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1982); Loengard and Cobb, Who Sold the Bush
Brothers' Beans?: The Commissioner's Power to Ignore the Transfer of an Asset
Prior to Sale, 35 TAx L. REv. 509 (1980).
89 Similarly, if the corporation distributes the expensed feed in redemption of a
shareholder's stock under § 302(b), or in a partial liquidation, the tax benefit rule
should apply since the corporation has the same opportunity for a duplicate deduction as in the case of a dividend.
90 Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d 524, 528-29 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
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of Old Corporation for many years and Old Corporation has deducted the
cost of feed used in its business. Old Corporation now liquidates and distributes its assets, including feed on hand, to New Corporation. New Corporation recognizes no gain or loss under section 332 and under section 334(b)(1)
carries over Old Corporation's basis in the assets, including its zero basis in
the feed. New Corporation will obtain no additional deduction for the feed;
the zero basis gives it nothing to write off.9 1 As a result, there is no need to
92
invoke the tax benefit rule.
The problem arises, and with it the need for application of the tax benefit
rule, only where the basis rules fail to carry over the old corporation's
investment in the property to the new holder. This situation occurs where
the distributee's basis in the stock of the liquidating corporation is deemed to
be a more appropriate basis referrent for the assets received on the liquidation than the basis of the assets to the liquidating corporation itself. 93 In
these cases, application of the tax benefit rule is called for in order to prevent
the opportunity for double deduction for the same asset.
An additional advantage of applying the tax benefit rule to liquidation
cases under section 336 is parity of result with section 337. The logic of those
sections implies that section 337 results should derive from section 336, not
the reverse. 94 Application of the tax benefit rule in section 337 cases, however,
has been established and consistency will be achieved only if the section 336
cases authoritatively incorporate the rule.

91 A dividend distribution to a corporate shareholder also involves continuity of
basis to the distributee, § 301(d)(2)(B), when basis is less than fair market value;
accordingly, a dividend of previously expensed feed to a corporate shareholder gives
rise to a zero basis and no further write-off in the hands of the distributee. The
below-value basis to the distributee offsets any potential excess deduction to the
distributor.
92 Similarly there is no need to invoke the tax benefit rule in a case like Nash v.
United States, 398 U.S. I (1970). In Nash, the Court refused to apply the tax benefit
rule to a taxpayer who transferred under § 351 accounts receivable for which a bad
debt reserve had been established and bad debt deductions had been claimed.
Although the opinion did not state explicitly how the transferee corporation should
report the accounts on its books, the Service has since ruled that the transferee
corporation includes the receivables at their face amount along with the reserve,
without claiming any further deduction. Rev. Rul. 78-280, 1978-2 C.B. 139, 140. The
transfer thus presents no opportunity to deduct the reserve twice, and there is no
need to apply the tax benefit rule. Cf. B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
11.65 (4th ed. 1979) (noting the
precedential value of Nash).
93 See I.R.C. § 334(b)(2) (1976) (basis determined by basis in stock of liquidating
corporation); id. § 334(c) (1976) (similar provision).
The 1982 Act remedies the basis-recognition discontinuity in stock purchases
treated as asset purchases by treating the target corporation as if it had sold its assets
pursuant to § 337. See supra note 44.
94 But cf. the 1982 Act, Section 224, which derives the tax treatment of stock
purchases treated as asset purchases from § 337.
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TAX BENEFIT RULE

The ProperMeasure of Tax Benefit in Bliss Dairy

It is one thing to say that the tax benefit rule should apply to liquidating
corporations otherwise entitled to nonrecognition under section 336. It is
another to say how the rule should operate. The variety of tax consequences
possible in corporate liquidations creates differing potentials for duplication
of deductions-the evil that the tax benefit rule combats in this situation.
The amount included in income should be limited to the potential duplication.
In a liquidation to which section 334(b)(1) applies, as we have seen, no
need to invoke the tax benefit rule arises. Suppose, however, New Corporation purchased all the stock of Old Corporation shortly before the liquidation. New Corporation's basis in the assets is determined under section
334(b)(2) by reference to its basis in the stock of Old Corporation; Old
Corporation's basis in its assets simply disappears for tax purposes. New
Corporation winds up with a basis in the feed determined by what it paid for
the stock. Since New Corporation recently purchased the stock, presumably
intending to liquidate Old Corporation, the basis which New Corporation
will be able to deduct generally will be close to fair market value. Since the
same feed potentially can be deducted twice-once by Old Corporation,
once by New Corporation-it is appropriate to invoke the tax benefit rule
and require Old Corporation to restore the feed to income. The appropriate
amount of the restoration is the lesser of (a) the deduction Old Corporation
previously claimed, or (b) the allocated stock basis in the feed, generally its
fair market value. 95
Bliss Dairy presents yet another variation: the liquidation there was pursuant to section 333. The distributees in such a liquidation determine basis in
the assets by reference to their basis in the stock of the liquidating corporation; 96 the corporation's basis in the assets again disappears. Unlike the
section 334(b)(2) situation, however, the basis in the stock need not reflect
current fair market value, since a recent arm's length purchase and sale may
not have occurred. Basis in the assets therefore differs from and generally is
less than their fair market value in a section 333 liquidation. The potential
duplication of the deduction thus is limited to the basis of the feed in the
hands of the distributees. As a result, the tax benefit rule inclusion to the
liquidating corporation in a section 333 liquidation also should be the lesser
of (a) the deduction previously claimed by the corporation, or (b) the basis of
the asset in the hands of the distributee.
It might be argued that the simplicity of the tax benefit rule is better
preserved on a slightly different view of the measure of inclusion. This
argument directs that the earlier deduction be treated as "wrong" and the
later deduction as "right," with the consequence that the earlier deduction
always is brought into income in full. This measure seems unduly onerous,
however, in order to prevent the duplication of deduction result. Suppose
the value of feed greatly depreciated between the time Old Corporation
deducted the expense and New Corporation caused the liquidation under
91
96

The 1982 Act makes this result explicit. See supra notes 44, 93.
I.R.C. § 334(c) (1976).
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section 332. If the liquidation qualifies under section 334(b)(1), New Corporation takes a zero basis in the feed, but presumably without inclusion in
income under the tax benefit rule. If, however, the liquidation is under
section 334(b)(2) and New Corporation takes a basis in the feed that is a
fraction of the original cost, Old Corporation must take into income the full
amount of the earlier deduction. To avoid this harsh result, which derives
from the disappearance of Old Corporation's basis, the, lesser-of-the-two
formulation seems more just.
V.

CONCLUSION

Every statutory provision, especially a part of a statute as complex as the
Internal Revenue Code, must be construed in context. The context for the
section 336 nonrecognition provision includes both structural tax considerations and an explicit legislative determination as expressed in the 1954
Senate Committee Report. The apparently inflexible language of section
336--"no gain or loss shall be recognized" -duplicates that of section 311
which embodies the same principle, and carries forward judicial limitations
on nonrecognition. Moreover, the cases since 1967 uniformly have construed section 337, where the same language appears, as being subject to tax
benefit limitations.
Congress intended nonrecognition of gain under section 336 and section
311 to apply when a corporation distributes to shareholders property embodying unrealized appreciation based on an advance in price for the asset.
Where the corporation distributes an asset that it has already expensed,
however, there is another type of appreciation which, if erased from tax
consideration; creates the potential for deductions in excess of the economic
cost incurred at the corporate level.
The potential for excess deduction arises most often by reason of the
annual reporting of taxable income, and the tax benefit rule limits the amount
of the deduction to the amount that would be available if all the events
occurred within a single accounting period. In other situations the possibility
for duplication of deductions arises by reason of discontinuities in the basis
of the distributed property. The tax benefit rule appropriately applies here as
well to eliminate potential duplication of the deduction. The amount of
inclusion in income under the tax benefit rule need not exceed the level
necessary to eliminate the potential for double deduction.
Courts have stumbled in an analogous tax area involving the application of
the tax benefit rule. When a corporation accrued and deducted a liability to a
shareholder, as for wages or interest, and the shareholder later forgave the
debt, the Tax Court gave an overly literal reading to section 118, and barred
application of the tax benefit rule and other doctrines that might have
required an appropriate inclusion in income. 97 The Tax Court later recognized its error but then felt constrained to follow its earlier precedents: it
reiterated a desire to correct the error, but directed the arguments for such
correction to other forums. Congress has heeded this plea and reversed the
specific result in question. 9 8 It is hoped that no similar salvage operation will be necessary in connection with section 336.
97 See Putoma Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 652, 663-72 (1976), aff'd, 601 F.2d
734 (5th Cir. 1979).
91 Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-589, § 2, 94 Stat. 3389, 3389-94
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